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IN T R O D U C T IO N
In January of 1978, the Federal Highway Administration (F H W A ) 
initiated a nationwide safety review of federal-aid highway construction 
projects completed since 1970. The purpose of the review was two-fold, 
to determine:
1. The degree to which safety concepts contained in the 1974 
A A SH TO  publication “Highway Design and Operational Prac­
tices Related to Safety” were being incorporated in new projects 
(this publication is commonly called the “Yellow Book” ).
2. The progress made in the timely safety upgrading of older 
federal-aid highways.
The reviews consisted of an office check of state safety-related poli­
cies, standards, and specifications, and a field performance review of 
newly completed projects. The field review was a detailed study of 
how the highway and its appurtenances perform in preventing accidents 
or in reducing accident severity. These reviews were performed under 
both day and night conditions. Actually the reviews were accomplished 
by the F H W A  field offices. A representative from the regional office 
was the leader of each regional review group, the remaining members 
of the review team usually consisted of the FH W A  Division safety 
program engineer from the state being reviewed and a safety program 
engineer from another division office in that region and state resource 
personnel. Division offices prepared a report on the findings in their 
state which were then forwarded along with a regional summary, to 
the headquarters office task force. The headquarters office task force 
was appointed by former administrator Cox to develop the review
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guidelines, participate in the actual reviews and prepare the final report. 
The task force consisted o f :
Chairman, R. Clarke Bennett, Office of Highway Safety, FH W A  
Then Deputy Administrator Karl S. Bowers, Office of Administra­
tor, FH W A
Roger Scott, Office of Engineering, FH W A  
Roy Anderson, National Transportation Safety Board 
Tom Alcorn, National Transportation Safety Board, Alternate 
The FH W A  safety review was a major undertaking, it involving 
over 150 FH W A  field office engineers and 130 state resource personnel. 
Representatives from the headquarters office task force participated in 
the safety reviews in 22 states. The effort by the headquarters office 
task force alone involved traveling 20,000 miles of highways and re­
viewing over 130 projects. This resulted in taking over 1,700 photo­
graphs of highway features.
The final report on this review was printed in December of 1978, 
and has been distributed. The report covers over 20 topics related to 
the safety of the highways and is far too extensive to cover in this 
presentation. Therefore, I will concentrate my discussion on the general 
findings and recommendations of the report.
General Findings
W ith respect to the original charge of the review, to determine if 
the Yellow Book safety concepts have been incorporated in new highway
Figure 1. Many new roads such as this one had good geometries and
gentle slopes.
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Figure 2. This curb in front of the guardrail offset could cause a vehicle
to vault the rail.
projects, we are happy to report that generally the states are doing an 
excellent job in following the Yellow Book safety concepts on new 
highways. There were some notable exceptions. A few states were still 
using curbs in the construction of high speed roadways. The review 
teams believe this compromised safety. See Figures 1 and 2.
W ith respect to the second charge, timely safety upgrading, there 
was wide variation between states, FH W A  Division, and Regions on 
safety upgrading policies and progress.
Some states—with numerous real hazards on their older interstate— 
are not contemplating any major safety upgrading until completion of 
the entire interstate. See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Inadequate guardrail on the approach to a bridge—a common 
problem on older interstate system highways in need of safety upgrading.
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Other states have accomplished some minor safety upgrading which 
is only partially effective. A few states have already accomplished sub­
stantial safety upgrading. See Figure 4.
Figure 4. A 5-in. surfacing was accomplished as part of a safety upgrading 
project. But it resulted in a hazardous 5-in. dropoff at the edge of the
pavement.
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There was very little evidence that the highway agencies are even 
planning to safety upgrade non-interstate highways. It was clearly 
evident to the review teams that the real opportunities to improve safety 
on our nation’s highways lie in improving the safety of the non-interstate 
highway system. These are the roads with the most hazardous conditions 
and the same 55 mph speed limit as the interstates. This is where 90% 
of all fatalities occur. This will be a difficult job! See Figure 5.
Figure 5. Inadequate guardrail, a common safety upgrading need on non­
interstate roads also.
In addition to the general findings already stated, there were a 
number of other areas noted during the review which need to receive 
greater attention at both the state and FH W A  field office level. As an 
example, accident data was not being used to evaluate the performance 
of highway features, or for operational reviews of sections of highways. 
In fact, at the time of the reviews, lack of readily available accident 
data, hampered performance evaluation in many of the 22 states visited 
by the headquarters office task force. Two states could only produce a 
general fatality rate for the sections of roadway under review. Five 
states provided accident data printouts at the time of the review, but 
because information on location or collision type was missing, the data 
was impossible to analyze. One state could only produce raw accident 
reports, none later than 1976. The remaining states had some type of 
data available, but only one state had used the data to analyze the 
safety of highway features in advance of the actual review.
Even on new construction, the review teams observed a number of 
breakaway sign, guardrail, and crash cushion installations that would 
not perform as intended in design. There is an obvious need to estab­
lish performance requirements for these devices as well as design specifi­
cations. A detailed discussion of this appears in the presentation on 
“Design and FH W A  Safety Review.”
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Another problem noted by the review teams was a wide variation 
between both states and regions related to safety policies, such as ac­
commodation of pedestrians—some states provide sidewalks in urban 
areas, others do not.
Maintenance of damaged roadside hardware also varied; some were 
replaced within 24 hours, others waited months. Policies on accommoda­
tion of utilities also varied widely; some states had no policy on utility 
placement, and it showed. See Figure 6.
Policies on frequency of repainting markings varied. Some repainted 
at short intervals—others waited as long as three years. Some states 
mark no passing zones, others do not, and some markings were confusing. 
There were various other policies related to signing construction and 
maintenance which could compromise safety. See Figures 7 and 8.
Figure 6. Utility poles compromise clear roadside, sign has breakaway
supports.
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Figure 7. Snow pack in front of crash cushion could cause a striking
vehicle to vault.
These variations in safety activity and policies indicate that the 
F H W A  Division offices need to strengthen their influence over state 
highway-related safety activities.
R E C O M M E N D A T IO N S
1. As a result of these findings, the review teams made scores of 
recommendations, many of which apply to a specific deficiency
Figure 8. Confusing lane stripe to exit should have been removed when 
mainline was extended.
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in a specific FH W A  division or region. The recommendations 
in the individual state reports have already been brought to the 
attention of state agency and some have been implemented. Safety 
performance reviews have proved an effective method for identi­
fying and quickly initiating needed safety-related improvements. 
Therefore, the headquarters office task force recommends that 
safety performance reviews should be continued on a formal 
basis as a routine procedure by all FH W A  offices. These follow­
up reviews have been designated as an FH W A  emphasis area for 
FY 1979.
2. I t  is obvious that FH W A  must take the initiative in accelerating 
safety upgrading on all federal-aid highways. As an overall 
recommendation, the task force believes that FH W A  should 
establish the minimum requirements necessary to constitute a 
safety upgrading program, initiate a study of safety upgrading 
needs based on these requirements and establish national goals 
for accomplishing the upgrading.
3. The next overall recommendation relates to the wide variation 
in F H W A  influence in state safety policies. I t  is recommended 
that the division safety program engineer be assigned specific 
responsibilities with respect to accident analysis, both at high 
accident locations and for the safety performance of highway 
hardware. The safety program engineer should also provide 
overseeing of safety standards and design criteria, safety upgrad­
ing projects, and route and project performance reviews.
4. Many of the safety deficiencies noted during the on-site review 
indicate there is a lack of knowledge on the part of construction 
and maintenance personnel on the concept of safety performance 
of highway hardware. I t  is recommended that FH W A  develop 
a series of training courses for both FH W A  field and state 
personnel. This training should cover, as a minimum, new 
safety technology and performance concepts, the timeliness of 
repair of damaged hardware, and safety maintenance priorities. 
This training is already underway. There is also a need to train 
field personnel in the analysis and use of accident records for 
monitoring the safety performance of highway features.
5. The task force also recommends that FH W A  undertake research 
to determine more realistic criteria for establishing speed limits 
which consider such safety-related criteria as roadside conditions, 
traffic conflicts, and driver acceptance. Research is also needed 
to establish a method to monitor the performance of various
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safety hardware using accident data supplemented by crash 
testing.
6. There were also a vast number of safety-related policies that 
need to be clarified at the federal and state level with respect to 
such things as:
(a) Pedestrian accommodation
(b) Maintenance and replacement of damaged highway hard­
ware
(c) Pavement remarking policies
(d) Delineation of roadside hazards
(e) Location of ground mounted sign supports and many, many 
others.
The task force recommends that each office in FH W A  headquarters 
review the final report and its recommendations, and no later than 90 
days after its distribution provide the Federal Highway Administrator 
with their recommendations for improvements.
In retrospect, the review identified far more problems than it pro­
vided solutions. The final report discusses over 20 highway-related 
safety topics and contains over 40 recommendations. Deputy Adminis­
trator John Hassell, after reviewing the report, has decided the best 
method of implementing the recommendations is through an FH W A  
task force of key field and headquarters office personnel. On December 
20, 1978, M r. Hassell appointed such a task force and gave the task 
force four charges.
1. T o  review the findings and recommendations and establish pri­
orities for improvements needed in FH W A  policies and pro­
cedures.
2. Recommend specific corrective action and assign lead responsi­
bility to accomplish this to the appropriate headquarters or field 
office.
3. Establish safety goals and time frames for implementing improve­
ments.
4. Develop a process to monitor the progress of the designated offices 
in accomplishing these improvements.
The first meeting was held January 22, 1979. As a result of this 
meeting, the following general instructions have been issued to all 
FH W A  offices.
1. FH W A  headquarters offices will be assigned responsibility for 
various report recommendations by the implementation task
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force. The offices should review the report and provide the task 
force with follow-up action for appropriate recommendations by 
February 28, 1979.
2. Follow-up safety performance reviews by FH W A  field offices 
should be started in May of 1979.
3. Specific deficiencies in highway safety which are identified through 
these reviews are to be corrected in a timely manner.
4. Safety performance reviews made this year should be forwarded 
to the office of highway safety by September 1, 1979. The imple­
mentation task force will evaluate these reviews, and together 
with results of other activities will provide a report to the admin­
istrator by October 1, 1979, on accomplishments this year.
CO N C LU SIO N
The implementation task force is now in the process of reviewing 
the various FH W A  office response to the report recommendations and 
will meet the week of March 19 to develop the final course of action.
As it now stands, the easy part of our job, the actual safety review, 
is completed, but the hard part, determining how and when the problems 
noted in the reviews can be corrected and avoided in the future, has 
just begun.
I t  certainly won’t be easy, but it can be done and FH W A  is going 
to be committing a major portion of its resources to improving the safety 
of the nation’s highways. I hope that if another extensive safety review 
is conducted, say five years from now, and the Purdue Road School 
wants a full report on the findings, the presenter will need no more than 
15 minutes, and at least half of his slides can show desirable practices 
instead of problems.
